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Introduction
Ranking Lorenz curves in accordance with first-degree Lorenz dominance means that the higher of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is preferred. The normative significance of this criterion follows from the fact that the higher of two non-intersecting Lorenz curves can be obtained from the lower Lorenz curve by means of rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer individuals, which means that the criterion of first-degree Lorenz dominance is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. When one Lorenz curve lies above another Lorenz curve, the higher Lorenz curve therefore displays less inequality than the lower Lorenz curve. However, since Lorenz curves may intersect, which is often the case in applied research, other approaches than first-degree Lorenz dominance are needed to reach conclusions.
Although the theoretical literature offers more general dominance criteria for ranking Lorenz curves, 1 these methods are generally viewed as hard to implement and the results difficult to interpret because they involve assumptions about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. Atkinson, 2003) . Thus, most empirical studies rely exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. It is, therefore, due time to start bridging the wide gap between the theoretical and the empirical strand of the literature concerned with rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. That is the focus of this paper.
Generalized Lorenz dominance approach. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2009) two alternative dominance criteria emerge as attractive generalizations of first-degree Lorenz dominance; one that aggregates the Lorenz curve from below (second-degree upward Lorenz dominance) and the other that aggregates the Lorenz curve from above (second-degree downward Lorenz dominance). Since firstdegree Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as well as downward Lorenz dominance, it follows that both methods preserve first-degree Lorenz dominance and thus are consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.
However, the transfer sensitivity of these criteria differ in the sense that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance place more emphasis on transfers occurring in the lower rather than in the upper part of the income distribution, whereas second-degree downward Lorenz dominance is most sensitive to transfers that occur in the upper part of the income distribution. This means that the criterion of second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the lower it occurs in the income distribution, provided that the proportion of individuals 3 between the donors and receivers is fixed. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance requires this type of transfer to be more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income distribution.
For situations where neither upward nor downward Lorenz dominance provide unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves, Aaberge (2009) introduced two hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria and moreover explored what restrictions various Lorenz dominance criteria place on the weight-functions of the general Mehran-Yaari family of rank-dependent measures of inequality. Furthermore, by introducing appropriate general principles of transfer sensitivity, Aaberge (2009) demonstrated that these criteria can be given a normative justification.
Inequality measures approach. An alternative and more common strategy for achieving rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves is to apply summary measures of inequality, which explains why numerous alternative measures of inequality are introduced in the literature. The most widely used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is equal to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference. But since no single measure can reflect all aspects of inequality exhibited by the Lorenz curve, the importance of using alternative measures to the Gini coefficient is universally acknowledged.
As proposed by Mehran (1976) , we may use weighed sums of the income share deviations as alternative rank-dependent measures of inequality to the Gini coefficient. The family of rankdependent measures of inequality, which includes the Gini coefficient, can alternatively be expressed as a weighted area between the Lorenz curve ( ) L(u) and its equality reference (u). The chosen specification of the rank-dependent weight-function, which may be considered as the preference function of a social planner, clarifies whether concern about inequality is particularly related to the lower, the central or the upper part of the income distribution. Thus, the functional form of the weightfunction exhibits the inequality aversion profile of the corresponding measure of inequality. Roughly speaking, we may say that a rank-dependent measure of inequality exhibits downside inequality aversion when the weight-function gives more emphasis to the deviation between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference, u L(u) − , for small u than for large u. By contrast, when the weightfunction gives more weight to the deviation u L(u) − for large u than for small u, we may say that the corresponding inequality measure exhibits upside inequality aversion. As demonstrates in Section 3, the hierarchical and nested structure of the dominance criteria allow us to identify the lowest degree of dominance required to reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves.
Moreover, Section 3 shows that the two hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria can be used to divide two generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of inequality into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality aversion profiles; one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside inequality aversion whereas the other exhibits successively higher degrees of upside inequality aversion. Since the criteria of Lorenz dominance provide convenient computational methods, these results will be used to identify the largest subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social preferences required to reach unambiguous ranking of any given set of Lorenz curves. From the weight-functions of these inequality measures, we obtain intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz dominance, which generally has been viewed as difficult to interpret. By doing so, we connect the dominance and the inequality measures approach to the ranking of intersecting Lorenz curves.
Empirical application. The evolution of earnings and income inequality in developed countries over the last few decades is one of he most extensively researched topics in economics. In a widely cited review of the literature, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) conclude that earnings and income inequality increased in most OECD countries during the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, they argue that many countries with fairly low levels of inequality experienced some of the largest increases in inequality.
These conclusions rest on numerous empirical studies relying exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality, like the Gini coefficient. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measure.
Section 4 examines the time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the period 1967-2005, showing how the dominance and the inequality measures approach to the ranking of intersecting Lorenz curves can be combined in a coherent way in empirical analysis. First, we identify the lowest degree of dominance, and thus the least restrictive social preferences, required to reach unambiguous rankings of the Lorenz curves over this period. Second, we pin down the largest subfamily of the generalized Gini families that is consistent with the actual ranking of these Lorenz curves. Finally, to ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion exhibited in the dominance results, we compute the weight-functions of these inequality measures.
The relationship between Lorenz dominance and the Gini coefficient
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean µ is defined by Under the restriction of equal mean incomes, the problem of ranking Lorenz curves formally corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has been utilized by e.g. Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves in the case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact that in cases of equal mean incomes the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to second-degree stochastic dominance 2 , which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces income inequality, provided that their ranks in the income distribution are unchanged.
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To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with distributions with equal means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal means and consider distributions of relative incomes. The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical studies of income inequality.
The standard criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves, called first-degree Lorenz dominance, is based on the following definition. 3
and the inequality holds strictly for some , . u 0 1 ∈ A social planner who prefers the dominating one of non-intersecting Lorenz curves favors transfers of incomes which reduce the differences between the income shares of the donor and the recipient, and is therefore said to be inequality averse.
In order to examine the relationship between various Lorenz dominance criteria and the measurement of inequality, we will rely on the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality 4 , defined by
where L is the Lorenz curve of the income distribution F with mean µ, and the weight-function P′ is the derivative of a continuous, differentiable and concave function P defined on the unit interval where (0) 0 P = and 1 1 P( ) = . To ensure that J P has the unit interval as its range, the condition 1 0 P ( ) ′ = is imposed on P. As demonstrated by Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 and Aaberge (2001) , the J P -family represents a preference relation defined either on the class of distribution functions (F) or on the class of Lorenz curves (L), where P can be interpreted as a preference function of a social planner. The preference function P assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank in the income distribution. Therefore, the functional form of P reveals the attitude towards inequality of a 7 social planner who employs J P to judge between Lorenz curves. The most well-known member of the J P -family is the Gini coefficient, which is obtained by inserting for
As demonstrated by Yaari (1988) , the J P -family of inequality measures characterizes the condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance when the functional form of the preference function P is being strictly concave. This means that J P satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for concave P-functions.
To deal with situations where Lorenz curves intersect a weaker principle than first-degree Lorenz dominance is called for. To this end it is normal to employ second-degree upward Lorenz dominance defined by
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1 ∈ .
The term upward dominance refers to the fact that the Lorenz curves are aggregated from below. 5 The aggregated Lorenz curve can be considered as a sum of weighted income shares, where the weights decrease linearly with increasing rank of the income receiver in the income distribution. Thus, a social planner who prefers the second-degree upward dominating of two intersecting Lorenz curves pays more attention to inequality in the lower than in the upper part of the income distribution. As proposed by Aaberge (2009) , an alternative ranking criterion to second-degree upward Lorenz dominance can be obtained by aggregating the Lorenz curve from above.
Definition 2.3 A Lorenz curve L 1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a Lorenz curve L 2 if
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1 ∈ . (2), forms a convenient basis for judging the normative significance of second-degree and higher degrees of Lorenz dominance.
To judge the normative significance of criteria for ranking intersecting Lorenz curves, more powerful principles than the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers are needed. To this end, Kolm (1976) introduced the principle of diminishing transfers, which for a fixed difference in income considers a transfer from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the further down in the income distribution it takes place. 6 As indicated by Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Muliere and Scarsini (1989) , the principle of diminishing transfers is, however, not consistent with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance. Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of the principle of diminishing transfers by accounting for the difference in the proportion of individuals between donors and recipients of the income transfers, rather than for the difference in income. This principle, denoted first-degree downside positional transfer sensitivity (DPTS) by Aaberge (2009) , proves to characterize seconddegree upward Lorenz dominance. By contrast, a social planner who considers a given transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income distribution, provided that the proportions of the population located between the receivers and the donors are equal, favors the principle of first-degree upside positional transfer sensitivity (UPTS). The UPTS characterizes second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. To ensure equivalence between second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and J P -measures as decision criteria, Aaberge (2009) proved 9 that it is necessary to restrict the preference functions P to be concave with positive third derivatives. 7
By contrast, the condition of negative third derivative of P yields second-degree downward
dominance.
An inequality averse social planner that supports the criterion of second-degree upward Lorenz dominance will act in line with the principle of first-degree DPTS and assign more weight to changes that take place in the lower part of the Lorenz curve than to changes that occur in the upper part of the Since the third derivative of the P-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient is always equal to 0, the Gini coefficient neither preserves second-degree upward Lorenz dominance nor second-degree downward Lorenz dominance apart from the case when the inequality in Definitions 2.3A and 2.3B
holds strictly for u 1 = and u 0 = , respectively. 8 Thus, the suggestion of Muliere and Scarsini (1989) that the Gini coefficient is coherent with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a definition of second-degree Lorenz dominance that abandons the condition of strict inequality (for some u 0,1 ∈ ). However, by assuming that the Lorenz curves cross only once the following results hold. 9
Proposition 2.1A. Assume that L 1 and L 2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and L 1 crosses L 2 initially from above, and let ( ) 
The proof of Proposition 2.1B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning used in the proof of Proposition 2.1A. Note that Proposition 2.1A can be considered as a dual version of the results of Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Dardanoni and Lambert (1988) (Proof in Appendix).
The relationship between general criteria of Lorenz dominance and generalized

Gini families of inequality measures
To deal with situations where second-degree (upward or downward) Lorenz dominance does not provide unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves, Aaberge (2009) introduced two hierarchical sequences of nested Lorenz dominance criteria that proved to divide the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality
(2) into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies. In this section, we use these results to divide two generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of inequality into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality aversion profiles; one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside inequality aversion whereas the other exhibits successively higher degrees of upside inequality aversion. As explained in Aaberge (2009), application of the criteria of upward Lorenz dominance requires social preferences with higher degree of aversion to downside inequality the higher is the degree of upward Lorenz dominance. A similar relationship holds between downward Lorenz dominance and aversion to upside inequality aversion. The highest degree of downside inequality aversion is achieved when focus is exclusively turned to the situation of the worst-off income recipient. Thus, the most downside inequality averse J P -measure that is obtained as the preference function approaches
( 3) can be considered as the J P -measure that exhibits the highest degree of downside inequality aversion.
Inserting (3) By contrast, the J P -measure that is obtained as P approaches 10
exhibits the highest degree of upside inequality aversion. Inserting (5) in (2) yields 10 Note that the normalization condition P'(0)=1 is ignored in this case. 12 1 1 1 u P F ( ) J ( L ) .
Thus, u P J , which we will denote the relative minimax criterion, is "dual" to the Rawlsian (relative) maximin criterion in the sense that it is compatible with the limiting case of downward Lorenz dominance. When the comparison of Lorenz curves is based on the relative minimax criterion, the preferred Lorenz curve is the one for which the largest relative income is smallest. The only transfers that decrease inequality are those from the richest unit to anyone else.
As will be demonstrated below, the extreme inequality aversion measure (4) is associated with the extended Gini family of inequality measures introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983) . This family is defined by
In order to introduce an alternative "generalized" Gini family of inequality measures, Aaberge (2000 Aaberge ( , 2007 draws on the practice from the statistical literature as motivation for using the moments of the As shown by the following expression ( ) ( )
(9) 11 The Lorenz family of inequality measures proves to be a subclass of the "illfare-ranked single-series Ginis" discussed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990) .
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there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Lorenz family and the integer subfamily .., r = for any integer r. Note that expressions (7) and (8) Differentiating P 1k defined by (10), we find that 1 1
As can be observed from (11) (v)
The sequence { } k G approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion as k → ∞ .
Note that P 1k has negative derivatives (of any order) when 0 k 1 < < . Thus, G k for 0 k 1 < < preserves downward Lorenz dominance of all degrees.
As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000) , the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a subfamily of J P formed by the following family of P-functions, ( ) ( ) k 1 2k 1 P (t) k 1 t t , k 1, 2,... k
Differentiating P 2k defined by (24) yields
, j 1 k P (t) k 1 k 1 k 2 .... k j 2 t , j 2,3,..., k 1 0 , j k 2, k 3,... 
The results of a similar evaluation of the Lorenz family of inequality measures as that carried out for the extended Gini family are summarized in the following corollary. 
Empirical Application: Income and Earnings Inequality in Norway, 1967-2005
Below, we combine the dominance and inequality measures approach to examine the time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the period 1967-2005.
Data. Our data are based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway covering the entire resident population in Norway between 1967 and 2004. The unique individual identifier allows merging information about individual characteristics, like age, with data on annual income and earnings taken from tax registers in each year. In the analysis, we employ two measures of income.
First, we use a measure of annual pre-tax income including all taxable income after deductions.
Secondly, we use a measure of earnings including all market income, from wages and selfemployment. Individuals with missing observation on income or earnings are excluded. In each year 1967--2004, we include the entire population of males aged 20--65 who were alive and resident in that
year. The reason for focusing on males is their role of breadwinner and primary wage-earners over most of this period.
It should be noted that we in the empirical analysis exclude individuals with incomes lower than the 1 percentile or higher than the 99 percentile, to avoid crossing of Lorenz curves due to measurement error and noise at the tails of the distributions.
Empirical results. Figure 1 reports Gini coefficients for income and earnings, suggesting that Norway has experienced a large increase in inequality since the early 1980s, like most other OECD countries.
Both income and earnings inequality decrease in the first period until the early 1980s, bottoming out at a level below .24. The trends then turn sharply upwards, approaching .32 in the early 1990s. While income inequality increase further, earnings inequality stabilizes over the last decade -a likely reason is the large increase in capital income in the upper part of the income distribution during this period (Aaberge and Atkinson, 2009 ). It should be noted that the spike in inequality in the early 1990s was associated with a tax-reform, and that inequality is likely to have increased more steadily in the absence of this reform (see e.g. Fjaerli and Aaberge, 2000) . The same is true for the year 2005, when another tax-reform was implemented. 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Year Gini
Income Earnings
A concern with the above conclusions is they might be sensitive to the arbitrary choice of inequality measure. In Table 1 , we therefore report dominance results for the Lorenz curves in income and earnings for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2005 . To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion exhibited in the dominance results, Table 2 computes the weight-functions of the two different generalized Gini families of inequality measures according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Specifically, Table 2 reports the ratios of the weights of the median individual compared to the 1 percent poorest, the 5 percent poorest, the 30 percent poorest, the 30 percent richest, and the 5 percent richest. We immediately see that the extended Gini family of inequality measures, G k defined by (7), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers that occur in the lower rather than the upper part of the distribution, as k increases. It is also evident that the Lorenz family of inequality measures, D k defined by (8), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers that occur in the upper rather than the lower part of the distribution, as k increases. Hence, the choice between upward and downward dominance depends on to what extent equalizing transfers between poorer individuals should be considered more important than those between richer individuals. Table 1 , where 1970 is used as the base-year. We see that first degree dominance is sufficient to rank 1970 as more equal than 2000 and 2005, both for earnings and income.
Consider first Panel 1 in
As stated above, first-degree dominance implies that all inequality measures that obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer yield an unambiguous ranking of these Lorenz curves. However, when considering the years 1980 and 1990 more general dominance criteria are required.
For example, when focusing on earnings we see that upward dominance of second degree is necessary to consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1990, and further that upward dominance of (at least) 22 degree is required to unambiguously rank 1970 as more equal than 1980. From Proposition 3.1 we know that upward dominance of second degree implies that G k will consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1990 for k greater or equal to 2. And further, that G k will consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1980 for k greater or equal 22. Table 2 shows that the weight-function associated with G 22
implies an extreme degree of downside inequality aversion, whereas G 2 is more sensitive to income differences in the central and upper part of the distribution. For instance, while G 2 assigns about twice as much weight to the 30 percent poorest compared to the median individual, G 22 weights the former individual 1640 times more than the latter individual. Hence, far more restrictive social preferences are required to unambiguously rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990 according to upward dominance.
Turing attention to downward dominance in earnings, we see that the picture is reversed: 1970 is actually dominated by 1980 and 1990 of second and seventh degree, respectively. This illustrates that a consistent ranking of 1970, 1980, and 1990 depends crucially on the choice between upward and downward dominance criteria, that is, to what extent concern about inequality is particularly related to inequality in the lower, the central or the upper part of the distribution. From Proposition 3.3 we know that downward dominance of second degree implies that D k will consistently ranks 1980 as more equal than 1970 for k greater or equal to 2, and 1990 as more equal than 1970 for k greater or equal to 7.
From the weights-functions displayed in Table 2 , we see that D 7 exhibits considerably more upside inequality aversion than D 2 . Consequently, less restrictive social preferences are required to unambiguously rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990 
Conclusion
Because Lorenz curves often intersect, other approaches than first-degree Lorenz dominance are called for. Although the theoretical literature offers more general dominance criteria for ranking Lorenz curves, 13 these methods are generally viewed as hard to implement and the results difficult to interpret because they involve assumptions about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. Atkinson, 2003) . Thus, most empirical studies rely exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. The purpose of this paper has 21 been to bridge the wide gap between the theoretical and the empirical strand of the literature concerned with rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves.
We first arrange the members of generalized Gini families of inequality measures into subfamilies according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Since the various criteria of higher degree Lorenz dominance provide convenient computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social preferences required to reach unambiguous ranking of a set of Lorenz curves. From the weightfunctions of these inequality measures we obtain intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz dominance. To demonstrate the usefulness of these methods for empirical applications, we examine As noted above the motivation for introducing the principles of DPTS (UPTS) was to successively strengthen the emphasis of transfers taking place lower down (higher up) in the income distribution.
